Files
homeprod/kubernetes/infrastructure/mail/stalwart/values.yaml

149 lines
6.0 KiB
YAML

# Stalwart Mail Server - Helm values
#
# TLS for the mail listeners is sourced from cert-manager: the
# mail-vhaudiquet-fr-tls Secret (see certificate.yaml) is mounted into the pod
# and pushed to Stalwart by the chart's tls-sync sidecar over JMAP, which also
# calls ReloadTlsCertificates on every cert-manager renewal.
# Container image
image:
repository: stalwartlabs/stalwart
tag: v0.16.11
pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
# Single-node RocksDB deployment.
replicaCount: 1
role: ""
pushShard: ""
# Recovery / bootstrap administrator.
# The Secret (stalwart-recovery-admin) is required for the lifetime of the
# deployment because the tls-sync sidecar authenticates to Stalwart's JMAP API
# with these credentials on every cert-manager renewal.
recoveryAdmin:
enabled: true
username: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/BGEPaI=,iv:QTV3fDckhrdxI0k43vUY/6Hr15pCcEQostuxcAHEF+g=,tag:nSGTlZJuclizN2AKtfGG0A==,type:str]
password: ""
existingSecret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:P/5gC7128OrelglEo5iTGTva45BOI3E=,iv:W0QngumMdOo/LFXdUrMN236CIHaOh8N9cj1wMEtfr3Q=,tag:5QLyu1Yd31YCZfRRYyK+2g==,type:str]
usernameKey: username
passwordKey: password
# Recovery mode suspends mail services and exposes only the management listener.
# Ship production values with this OFF.
recoveryMode:
enabled: false
port: 8080
logLevel: info
extraEnv: {}
extraSecretEnv: {}
# The bootstrap hook Job provisions a *fresh* domain/accounts/OIDC directory.
bootstrap:
enabled: false
# cert-manager TLS integration for the mail (SMTP/IMAP/POP3 STARTTLS + implicit
# TLS) listeners. The Secret below is produced by the Certificate in
# certificate.yaml (letsencrypt-production, Cloudflare DNS-01).
mailTls:
enabled: true
existingSecret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Mi40TeV+sRmZaEBMsOI0qgXWkMyNmQ==,iv:ExlgVMe+CONDWLmZY4uze+jhVvXN92zb2ptcLCor3Dw=,tag:4VQ38SxY28yR7kp1u69auw==,type:str]
certKey: tls.crt
privateKeyKey: tls.key
mountPath: /etc/stalwart/tls/ingress
hostname: mail.vhaudiquet.fr
domain: vhaudiquet.fr
# How often the sidecar re-checks the mounted cert for changes.
reloadIntervalSeconds: 300
# config.json contents - ONLY the DataStore object. All other settings
# (listeners, storage backends, domains, accounts, certs) live in the database
# and are managed via JMAP/WebUI.
config:
'@type': RocksDb
path: /var/lib/stalwart
# Main Service: ClusterIP. Used by the Ingress for the management WebUI (mgmt)
# and for in-cluster access. Mail L4 ports are exposed separately via mailService.
service:
type: ClusterIP
ports:
smtp: 25
smtps: 465
submission: 587
imap: 143
imaps: 993
pop3: 110
pop3s: 995
sieve: 4190
http: 80
https: 443
mgmt: 8080
# Dedicated LoadBalancer for SMTP/IMAP/POP3/Sieve (L4). HTTP/HTTPS/mgmt are NOT
# exposed here - the WebUI is reached via the Ingress (Traefik) below.
# The WAN router NAT for 25/465/587/993/995/4190 must be repointed to this IP.
mailService:
enabled: true
name: stalwart-mail
type: LoadBalancer
loadBalancerIP: 10.2.2.5
annotations: {}
# WebUI ingress. TLS is terminated by Caddy at the edge (wildcard cert), so the
# path is: public -> Caddy (TLS) -> Traefik (HTTP) -> this Ingress -> mgmt:8080.
# No TLS block here.
ingress:
enabled: true
annotations: {}
hosts:
- host: mail.vhaudiquet.fr
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
portName: mgmt
tls: []
# Persistent volume for the RocksDB data directory.
persistence:
enabled: true
accessMode: ReadWriteOnce
storageClass: longhorn
size: 50Gi
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
cpu: "1"
memory: 1Gi
# Override chart defaults to add fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch.
# Without this, kubelet recursively chowns every file in the NFS-backed PVC
# on every pod start (15k+ RocksDB files), causing multi-minute delays.
# OnRootMismatch skips the recursive chown if the volume root already
# has the correct owner (UID 2000).
podSecurityContext:
fsGroup: 2000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
runAsUser: 2000
runAsGroup: 2000
runAsNonRoot: true
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containerSecurityContext: {}
sops:
lastmodified: "2026-08-26T19:28:03Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Fh5vxhnPiSRaC/xMV06GwoNAqfiZYJHFj3xKrWzMwau2aC62JTDkEpmm/UN7w4ILQk05xjUkcoSJF5IcKT6+gjkLRVt8qwiarJDZ3SbwM11x7rm4m0wBTJIMeytq1h68l5mQ9i5yW5bxnBNDpUqaAAmq/Ev0/+6lspXw/kfJTUw=,iv:Tg5ZYPd2bpTN/gu99oJEcl0aKiNtX5xca0MUfzCXILo=,tag:2IKyAEuTjp8QhhUaNb1+5A==,type:str]
pgp:
- created_at: "2026-08-26T19:28:03Z"
enc: |-
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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
fp: DC6910268E657FF70BA7EC289974494E76938DDC
encrypted_regex: ^(password|value|ssh-key|api-key|user|username|privateKey|clientSecret|clientId|apiKey|extraArgs.*|.*Secret.*|extraEnvVars|.*SECRET.*|.*secret.*|key|.*Password|.*PASS|.*SOCIALACCOUNT_PROVIDERS|.*\.ya?ml)$
mac_only_encrypted: true
version: 3.10.2