net: bootp: Prevent out-of-bounds read in dhcp_message_type

dhcp_message_type() scans DHCP options looking for a 0xff
end-of-options marker with no check that the scan pointer stays
within the received packet. A server can send a crafted OFFER with
no 0xff terminator and large option length fields, advancing the
pointer past bp_vend[312] into adjacent heap memory.

This is the same class of bug as CVE-2024-42040, which fixed the
related bootp_process_vendor() call site. Fix it by adding an end
parameter to dhcp_message_type() and checking that popt is lower
than end.

Signed-off-by: Francois Berder <fberder@outlook.fr>
Reviewed-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Francois Berder
2026-06-03 17:22:24 +02:00
committed by Jerome Forissier
parent 2b612de895
commit f447887238
+4 -4
View File
@@ -997,13 +997,13 @@ static void dhcp_packet_process_options(struct bootp_hdr *bp)
}
}
static int dhcp_message_type(unsigned char *popt)
static int dhcp_message_type(unsigned char *popt, unsigned char *end)
{
if (net_read_u32((u32 *)popt) != htonl(BOOTP_VENDOR_MAGIC))
return -1;
popt += 4;
while (*popt != 0xff) {
while (popt < end && *popt != 0xff) {
if (*popt == 53) /* DHCP Message Type */
return *(popt + 2);
if (*popt == 0) {
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ static void dhcp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
strlen(CONFIG_SYS_BOOTFILE_PREFIX)) == 0) {
#endif /* CONFIG_SYS_BOOTFILE_PREFIX */
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(UNIT_TEST) &&
dhcp_message_type((u8 *)bp->bp_vend) == -1) {
dhcp_message_type((u8 *)bp->bp_vend, (u8 *)pkt + len) == -1) {
debug("got BOOTP response; transitioning to BOUND\n");
goto dhcp_got_bootp;
}
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ static void dhcp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
case REQUESTING:
debug("DHCP State: REQUESTING\n");
if (dhcp_message_type((u8 *)bp->bp_vend) == DHCP_ACK) {
if (dhcp_message_type((u8 *)bp->bp_vend, (u8 *)pkt + len) == DHCP_ACK) {
dhcp_got_bootp:
dhcp_packet_process_options(bp);
/* Store net params from reply */