Merge patch series "allow control DTB to double as "FIT image""

Rasmus Villemoes <rv@rasmusvillemoes.dk> says:

The commit message for patch 1 explains what it is I'd like to be able
to do, but here's some more background:

For a long time, we've embedded the boot script in the U-Boot binary
by building a bootscript.itb, and using a .dtsi like

  / {
          config {
                 bootscript = /incbin/("/path/to/bootscript.itb");
          };
  };

which in turn is mentioned in CONFIG_DEVICE_TREE_INCLUDES, that
bootscript.itb FIT image has been embedded in U-Boot's control
dtb. Running that was then a matter of doing

  fdt addr ${fdtcontroladdr} && fdt get addr bsaddr /config bootscript && source ${bsaddr}

There are a couple of advantage of having the bootscript (and other
script logic) embedded in the U-Boot binary. First, there's no need to
figure out some separate partition to store the script in, and making
sure that gets updated whenever the bootloader itself does. Second,
one doesn't need to worry about verifying the script; whatever steps
one needs to take to implement secure boot for U-Boot itself will by
necessity also cover the control dtb (if nothing else then because
that's where the public key for the kernel verification lives). And
third, the boot script is automatically updated together with U-Boot
itself; and if U-Boot is stored in an eMMC boot partition, that update
is guaranteed to be atomic.

Now with the stricter requirements of libfdt starting from v2026.04,
the above command no longer worked, or only half the time, because the
embedded FIT image may not land on an 8-byte aligned address. So that
line had to be changed a little (line breaks added)

  fdt addr ${fdtcontroladdr}
    && fdt get addr bsaddr /config bootscript
    && fdt get size bssize /config bootscript
    && cp.b ${bsaddr} ${loadaddr} ${bssize}
    && source ${loadaddr}

which is getting quite unwieldy.

Then it struck me that one could perhaps simplify all of this quite a
lot: Cut out the intermediate bootscript.itb, just create a .dtsi
which directly puts a /images node inside the control dtb

/ {
  	images {
		default = "bootscript";
		bootscript {
			description = "Boot script";
			data = /incbin/("/path/to/bootscript.sh");
			type = "script";
			compression = "none";
		};
	};
};

and treat the control dtb itself as a FIT image; so the command to put
in $bootcmd becomes simply

  source ${fdtcontroladdr}:bootscript

and embedding other pieces of callable scripts is quite trivial.

And that almost works out-of-the-box, except for the fit_check_format() sanity check.

Introduce a CONFIG_ knob that allows one to opt out of those sanity
checks, for the special case of the address being checked being
identical to gd->fdt_blob.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260602213013.558064-1-rv@rasmusvillemoes.dk
This commit is contained in:
Tom Rini
2026-06-11 07:56:52 -06:00
9 changed files with 156 additions and 6 deletions
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR MIT)
echo "* default script"
+4
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR MIT)
# Some comment.
echo "* inner"
+4
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR MIT)
echo "* outer 1"
source ${fdtcontroladdr}:inner
echo "* outer 2"
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR MIT)
/ {
images {
default = "boot";
boot {
description = "Test boot script";
data = /incbin/("sandbox-boot.sh");
type = "script";
compression = "none";
};
outer {
description = "Script testing recursion";
data = /incbin/("sandbox-outer.sh");
type = "script";
compression = "none";
};
inner {
description = "Another test script";
data = /incbin/("sandbox-inner.sh");
type = "script";
compression = "none";
};
};
};
+13
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@@ -103,6 +103,19 @@ config FIT_FULL_CHECK
of bugs or omissions in the code. This includes a bad structure,
multiple root nodes and the like.
config CONTROL_DTB_AS_FIT
bool "Allow U-Boot's control DTB to act as FIT image"
help
Enable this to exempt U-Boot's control DTB from the sanity
checks done to ensure FIT images are valid. This can for
example be used to embed whole scripts in the control DTB,
that can then be invoked using 'source ${fdtcontroladdr}'.
In a secure boot setup, this is safe, as the control DTB is
necessarily covered by any mechanism verifying U-Boot and
can therefore be trusted. This only affects the case where
the image being checked is gd->fdt_blob. See
doc/develop/devicetree/control.rst for details.
config FIT_SIGNATURE
bool "Enable signature verification of FIT uImages"
depends on DM
+18 -6
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@@ -1658,6 +1658,16 @@ static int fdt_check_no_at(const void *fit, int parent)
return 0;
}
static int fit_check_images_node(const void *fit)
{
if (fdt_path_offset(fit, FIT_IMAGES_PATH) < 0) {
log_debug("Wrong FIT format: no images parent node\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
return 0;
}
int fit_check_format(const void *fit, ulong size)
{
int ret;
@@ -1670,6 +1680,13 @@ int fit_check_format(const void *fit, ulong size)
return -ENOEXEC;
}
/*
* For the control DTB to act as a FIT image, we only require
* an /images node.
*/
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(CONTROL_DTB_AS_FIT) && fit == gd_fdt_blob())
return fit_check_images_node(fit);
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_FULL_CHECK)) {
/*
* If we are not given the size, make do with calculating it.
@@ -1718,12 +1735,7 @@ int fit_check_format(const void *fit, ulong size)
}
/* mandatory subimages parent '/images' node */
if (fdt_path_offset(fit, FIT_IMAGES_PATH) < 0) {
log_debug("Wrong FIT format: no images parent node\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
return 0;
return fit_check_images_node(fit);
}
int fit_conf_find_compat(const void *fit, const void *fdt)
+2
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y
CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_CRT_FILE="board/sandbox/capsule_pub_key_good.crt"
CONFIG_BUTTON_CMD=y
CONFIG_FIT=y
CONFIG_CONTROL_DTB_AS_FIT=y
CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE=y
CONFIG_FIT_CIPHER=y
CONFIG_FIT_VERITY=y
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_STACKPROTECTOR_TEST=y
CONFIG_CMD_SPAWN=y
CONFIG_MAC_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_OF_LIVE=y
CONFIG_DEVICE_TREE_INCLUDES="sandbox_scripts.dtsi"
CONFIG_ENV_IS_NOWHERE=y
CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_FAT=y
CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_EXT4=y
+58
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@@ -232,6 +232,64 @@ outside the U-Boot repository. You can use `DEVICE_TREE_INCLUDES` Kconfig
option to specify a list of .dtsi files that will also be included when
building .dtb files.
Scripts embedded in control DTB
-------------------------------
The `DEVICE_TREE_INCLUDES` option can also be used to make the control
DTB serve double duty as a FIT image. By including a `scripts.dtsi`
file containing something like::
/ {
images {
default = "boot";
boot {
description = "Bootscript";
data = /incbin/("boot.sh");
type = "script";
compression = "none";
};
factory-reset {
description = "Script for performing factory reset";
data = /incbin/("factory-reset.sh");
type = "script";
compression = "none";
};
};
};
one can call those scripts using the `source` command in the U-Boot shell::
source ${fdtcontroladdr}:boot
or just ``source ${fdtcontroladdr}`` for invoking the default.
Since one does not need to separately build a "real" FIT image
containing those scripts, this simplifies both the build process and
the boot logic, as the latter does not need to first load the FIT
image from storage.
Another advantage is that when the bootloader and boot script must be
updated together, it is easier to achieve a guaranteed atomic update
when the boot script is embedded inside the U-Boot binary, instead of
stored separately.
For the above to work, one must enable the `CONTROL_DTB_AS_FIT` config
option, which will (when the address passed to the `source` command is
the address of U-Boot's control DTB) elide certain sanity checks that
are normally done: With the above `.dtsi` snippet, the control DTB
does not quite become a "real" FIT image - it lacks `timestamp` and
`description` properties, but more importantly, FIT images cannot
contain nodes with `@` in their names (unit addresses) anywhere, and
the control DTB obviously does have such nodes.
This is not a security problem, as the control DTB is necessarily
trusted. In any secure boot setup where the bootloader is verified,
that mechanism must also include verification of the control DTB. So
in fact, since the scripts embedded this way are then also
automatically verified, it simplifies implementation of secure
boot. When using a separate FIT image, one must build it with
appropriate signatures, just as when building a FIT image containing a
kernel/dtb/initramfs.
Devicetree bindings schema checks
---------------------------------
+31
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@@ -34,3 +34,34 @@ def test_source(ubman):
ubman.run_command('fdt rm /images default')
assert 'Fail' in ubman.run_command('source || echo Fail')
assert 'Fail' in ubman.run_command('source \\# || echo Fail')
@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_echo')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_source')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('fit')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('control_dtb_as_fit')
def test_source_control_dtb(ubman):
output = ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr}')
assert '* default script' in output
output = ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr}:boot')
assert '* default script' in output
output = ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr}:outer')
assert '* outer 1' in output
assert '* inner' in output
assert '* outer 2' in output
output = ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr}:inner')
assert '* outer' not in output
assert '* inner' in output
assert 'Fail' in ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr}:no-such-script || echo Fail')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_echo')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_source')
@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('fit')
@pytest.mark.notbuildconfigspec('control_dtb_as_fit')
def test_source_reject_control_dtb(ubman):
assert 'Fail' in ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr} || echo Fail')
assert 'Fail' in ubman.run_command('source ${fdtcontroladdr}:boot || echo Fail')