vhaudiquet
75585f2dd3
The client tools need one shared definition of what a tool may do, and the daemon needs to enforce exactly that definition, not a hand-copied copy of it. This crate is that definition, pure: no HTTP client, no process — the allowlist as data, the version header as constants, the request/response and error types, and the conformance suite that drives any transport through the checks the contract promises (the bearer gate, the version handshake, the allowlist's denials, round-trips through every allowed route, one error shape). `agent_allowed` is the whole security surface in one function: method and path segments with `*` and `**`, exact otherwise — a daemon's middleware asks it and nothing else, so the claw's scoping and the tools' expectations cannot drift apart. The suite runs against a mock router in this crate's tests and against the daemon's real axum router in the claw's; same results is the definition of implementing the contract.