Files
u-boot-krane/boot/image-fit-sig.c
T
James HilliardandTom Rini 58c2284a1a cmd: fdt: keep control FDT during checksign
The fdt checksign command accepts an optional address for an FDT
containing public keys. It currently installs that blob as gd->fdt_blob
before verifying the FIT configuration.

This breaks verification with DM-backed crypto drivers which have not
probed yet, since the later probe path expects gd->fdt_blob to remain
U-Boot's control FDT. For example, an ECDSA verifier can be bound from
the control FDT but fail to probe after fdt checksign points
gd->fdt_blob at the key-only DTB.

Add a FIT config verification helper that takes the key blob explicitly
and use it from fdt checksign. This keeps gd->fdt_blob unchanged while
still allowing the command to verify against an external key DTB.

Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
2026-07-13 17:06:29 -06:00

722 lines
19 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc.
*/
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
#include "mkimage.h"
#include <time.h>
#else
#include <log.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <asm/global_data.h>
DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
#endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/
#include <fdt_region.h>
#include <image.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
#define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100
#define FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF 4096
/**
* fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions
*
* Given a list of fdt_regions, create a list of image_regions. This is a
* simple conversion routine since the FDT and image code use different
* structures.
*
* @fit: FIT image
* @fdt_regions: Pointer to FDT regions
* @count: Number of FDT regions
* @region: Pointer to image regions, which must hold @count records. If
* region is NULL, then (except for an SPL build) the array will be
* allocated.
* @return: Pointer to image regions
*/
struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
struct fdt_region *fdt_regions,
int count,
struct image_region *region)
{
int i;
debug("Hash regions:\n");
debug("%10s %10s\n", "Offset", "Size");
/*
* Use malloc() except in SPL (to save code size). In SPL the caller
* must allocate the array.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XPL_BUILD) && !region)
region = calloc(sizeof(*region), count);
if (!region)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
debug("%10x %10x\n", fdt_regions[i].offset,
fdt_regions[i].size);
region[i].data = fit + fdt_regions[i].offset;
region[i].size = fdt_regions[i].size;
}
return region;
}
static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
const void *fit, int noffset,
const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
char **err_msgp)
{
const char *algo_name;
const char *padding_name;
if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_VAL(FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)) {
*err_msgp = "Total size too large";
return 1;
}
if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
*err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
return -1;
}
padding_name = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "padding", NULL);
if (!padding_name)
padding_name = RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME;
memset(info, '\0', sizeof(*info));
info->keyname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, FIT_KEY_HINT, NULL);
info->fit = fit;
info->node_offset = noffset;
info->name = algo_name;
info->checksum = image_get_checksum_algo(algo_name);
info->crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(algo_name);
info->padding = image_get_padding_algo(padding_name);
info->fdt_blob = key_blob;
info->required_keynode = required_keynode;
printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname);
if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto) {
*err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm";
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int fit_image_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, const void *data,
size_t size, const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
char **err_msgp)
{
struct image_sign_info info;
struct image_region region;
uint8_t *fit_value;
int fit_value_len;
*err_msgp = NULL;
if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob,
required_keynode, err_msgp))
return -1;
if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
&fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
return -1;
}
region.data = data;
region.size = size;
if (info.crypto->verify(&info, &region, 1, fit_value, fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Verification failed";
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int fit_image_verify_sig(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
const char *data, size_t size,
const void *key_blob, int key_offset)
{
int noffset;
char *err_msg = "";
int verified = 0;
int ret;
/* Process all hash subnodes of the component image node */
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, image_noffset) {
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
/*
* We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the
* name root but different @ suffix to be equal
*/
if (strchr(name, '@')) {
err_msg = "Node name contains @";
goto error;
}
if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data, size,
key_blob, -1, &err_msg);
if (ret) {
puts("- ");
} else {
puts("+ ");
verified = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
goto error;
}
return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
error:
printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' image node\n",
err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
fit_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
return -1;
}
int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
const char *data, size_t size,
const void *key_blob, int *no_sigsp)
{
int verify_count = 0;
int noffset;
int key_node;
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
if (!key_blob)
return 0;
#endif
/* Work out what we need to verify */
*no_sigsp = 1;
key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
if (key_node < 0) {
debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
fdt_strerror(key_node));
return 0;
}
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) {
const char *required;
int ret;
required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
NULL);
if (!required || strcmp(required, "image"))
continue;
ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
key_blob, noffset);
if (ret) {
printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL));
return ret;
}
verify_count++;
}
if (verify_count)
*no_sigsp = 0;
return 0;
}
/**
* fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
*
* Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher
* subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer.
*
* @fit: FIT blob
* @image_noffset: Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1)
* @node_inc: Array of path pointers to fill
* @count: Pointer to current count (updated on return)
* @max_nodes: Maximum entries in @node_inc
* @buf: Buffer for packed path strings
* @buf_used: Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return)
* @buf_len: Total size of @buf
* Return: 0 on success, -ve on error
*/
static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes,
char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len)
{
int noffset, hash_count, ret, len;
if (*count >= max_nodes)
return -ENOSPC;
ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used,
buf_len - *buf_used);
if (ret < 0)
return -ENOENT;
len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
*buf_used += len;
/* Add all this image's hash subnodes */
hash_count = 0;
for (noffset = fdt_first_subnode(fit, image_noffset);
noffset >= 0;
noffset = fdt_next_subnode(fit, noffset)) {
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME)))
continue;
if (*count >= max_nodes)
return -ENOSPC;
ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
buf_len - *buf_used);
if (ret < 0)
return -ENOENT;
len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
*buf_used += len;
hash_count++;
}
if (!hash_count) {
printf("No hash nodes in image '%s'\n",
fdt_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
return -ENOMSG;
}
/* Add this image's cipher node if present */
noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME);
if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
if (noffset < 0)
return -EIO;
if (*count >= max_nodes)
return -ENOSPC;
ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
buf_len - *buf_used);
if (ret < 0)
return -ENOENT;
len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
*buf_used += len;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
*
* Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
* node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
* cipher subnodes.
*
* Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible,
* default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default.
*
* @fit: FIT blob
* @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset
* @node_inc: Array to fill with path string pointers
* @max_nodes: Size of @node_inc array
* @buf: Buffer for packed null-terminated path strings
* @buf_len: Size of @buf
* Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error
*/
static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
char *buf, int buf_len)
{
const char *conf_name;
int image_count;
int prop_offset;
int used = 0;
int count = 0;
int ret, len;
conf_name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL);
/* Always include the root node and the configuration node */
if (max_nodes < 2)
return -ENOSPC;
len = 2; /* "/" + nul */
if (len > buf_len)
return -ENOSPC;
strcpy(buf, "/");
node_inc[count++] = buf;
used += len;
len = snprintf(buf + used, buf_len - used, "%s/%s", FIT_CONFS_PATH,
conf_name) + 1;
if (used + len > buf_len)
return -ENOSPC;
node_inc[count++] = buf + used;
used += len;
/* Process each image referenced by the config */
image_count = 0;
fdt_for_each_property_offset(prop_offset, fit, conf_noffset) {
const char *prop_name;
int img_count, i;
fdt_getprop_by_offset(fit, prop_offset, &prop_name, NULL);
if (!prop_name)
continue;
/* Skip properties that are not image references */
if (!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DESC_PROP) ||
!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_COMPAT_PROP) ||
!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DEFAULT_PROP))
continue;
img_count = fdt_stringlist_count(fit, conf_noffset, prop_name);
for (i = 0; i < img_count; i++) {
int noffset;
noffset = fit_conf_get_prop_node_index(fit,
conf_noffset,
prop_name, i);
if (noffset < 0)
continue;
ret = fit_config_add_hash(fit, noffset, node_inc,
&count, max_nodes, buf, &used,
buf_len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
image_count++;
}
}
if (!image_count) {
printf("No images in config '%s'\n", conf_name);
return -ENOMSG;
}
return count;
}
/**
* fit_config_check_sig() - Check the signature of a config
*
* Here we are looking at a particular signature that needs verification (here
* signature-1):
*
* configurations {
* default = "conf-1";
* conf-1 {
* kernel = "kernel-1";
* fdt = "fdt-1";
* signature-1 {
* algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
* value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
* };
* };
*
* @fit: FIT to check
* @noffset: Offset of the signature node being checked (e.g.
* /configurations/conf-1/signature-1)
* @conf_noffset: Offset of configuration node (e.g. /configurations/conf-1)
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
* @required_keynode: Offset in @key_blob of the required key node,
* if any. If this is given, then the configuration wil not
* pass verification unless that key is used. If this is
* -1 then any signature will do.
* @err_msgp: In the event of an error, this will be pointed to a
* help error string to display to the user.
* Return: 0 if all verified ok, <0 on error
*/
static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
char **err_msgp)
{
static char * const exc_prop[] = {
FIT_DATA_PROP,
FIT_DATA_SIZE_PROP,
FIT_DATA_POSITION_PROP,
FIT_DATA_OFFSET_PROP,
};
char *node_inc[IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES];
char hash_buf[FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF];
struct image_sign_info info;
const uint32_t *strings;
uint8_t *fit_value;
int fit_value_len;
int max_regions;
char path[200];
int count;
int len;
uint32_t size;
debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, key_blob,
fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
fit_get_name(key_blob, required_keynode, NULL));
*err_msgp = NULL;
if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob,
required_keynode, err_msgp))
return -1;
if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
&fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
return -1;
}
/* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */
count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset,
node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
if (count < 0) {
*err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list";
return -1;
}
debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count);
for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i)
debug(" '%s'\n", node_inc[i]);
/*
* Each node can generate one region for each sub-node. Allow for
* 7 sub-nodes (hash-1, signature-1, etc.) and some extra.
*/
max_regions = 20 + count * 7;
struct fdt_region fdt_regions[max_regions];
/* Get a list of regions to hash */
count = fdt_find_regions(fit, node_inc, count,
exc_prop, ARRAY_SIZE(exc_prop),
fdt_regions, max_regions - 1,
path, sizeof(path), 0);
if (count < 0) {
*err_msgp = "Failed to hash configuration";
return -1;
}
if (count == 0) {
*err_msgp = "No data to hash";
return -1;
}
if (count >= max_regions - 1) {
*err_msgp = "Too many hash regions";
return -1;
}
/* Add the strings */
strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", &len);
if (strings) {
if (len < (int)(2 * sizeof(fdt32_t))) {
*err_msgp = "Invalid hashed-strings property";
return -1;
}
size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
/*
* The offset should be already validated by fdt_check_header();
* validate the size here.
*/
if (size > fdt_size_dt_strings(fit)) {
*err_msgp = "Strings region is out of bounds";
return -1;
}
/*
* The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
* This is set in tool/image-host.c
*/
fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
fdt_regions[count].size = size;
count++;
}
/* Allocate the region list on the stack */
struct image_region region[count];
fit_region_make_list(fit, fdt_regions, count, region);
if (info.crypto->verify(&info, region, count, fit_value,
fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Verification failed";
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fit_config_verify_key() - Verify that a configuration is signed with a key
*
* Here we are looking at a particular configuration that needs verification:
*
* configurations {
* default = "conf-1";
* conf-1 {
* kernel = "kernel-1";
* fdt = "fdt-1";
* signature-1 {
* algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
* value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
* };
* };
*
* We must check each of the signature subnodes of conf-1. Hopefully one of them
* will match the key at key_offset.
*
* @fit: FIT to check
* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g.
* /configurations/conf-1)
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
* @key_offset: Offset of the key to check within @key_blob
* @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the
* configuration node has an invalid name
*/
static int fit_config_verify_key(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob, int key_offset)
{
int noffset;
char *err_msg = "No 'signature' subnode found";
int verified = 0;
int ret;
/* Process all hash subnodes of the component conf node */
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, conf_noffset) {
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
ret = fit_config_check_sig(fit, noffset, conf_noffset,
key_blob, key_offset,
&err_msg);
if (ret) {
puts("- ");
} else {
puts("+ ");
verified = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
goto error;
}
if (verified)
return 0;
error:
printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' config node\n",
err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL));
return -EPERM;
}
/**
* fit_config_verify_required_keys() - verify any required signatures for config
*
* This looks through all the signatures we expect and verifies that at least
* all the required ones are valid signatures for the configuration
*
* @fit: FIT to check
* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g.
* /configurations/conf-1)
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
* @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the
* configuration node has an invalid name
*/
static int fit_config_verify_required_keys(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob)
{
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL);
int noffset;
int key_node;
int verified = 0;
int reqd_sigs = 0;
bool reqd_policy_all = true;
const char *reqd_mode;
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
if (!key_blob)
return 0;
#endif
/*
* We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the
* name root but different @ suffix to be equal
*/
if (strchr(name, '@')) {
printf("Configuration node '%s' contains '@'\n", name);
return -EPERM;
}
/* Work out what we need to verify */
key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
if (key_node < 0) {
debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
fdt_strerror(key_node));
return 0;
}
/* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(key_blob, key_node, "required-mode", NULL);
if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
reqd_policy_all = false;
debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
/*
* The algorithm here is a little convoluted due to how we want it to
* work. Here we work through each of the signature nodes in the
* public-key area. These are in the U-Boot control devicetree. Each
* node was created by signing a configuration, so we check if it is
* 'required' and if so, request that it be verified.
*/
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) {
const char *required;
int ret;
required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
NULL);
if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
continue;
reqd_sigs++;
ret = fit_config_verify_key(fit, conf_noffset, key_blob,
noffset);
if (ret) {
if (reqd_policy_all) {
printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL));
return ret;
}
} else {
verified++;
if (!reqd_policy_all)
break;
}
}
if (reqd_sigs && !verified) {
printf("Failed to verify 'any' of the required signature(s)\n");
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
int fit_config_verify_with_key_blob(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob)
{
return fit_config_verify_required_keys(fit, conf_noffset, key_blob);
}
int fit_config_verify(const void *fit, int conf_noffset)
{
return fit_config_verify_with_key_blob(fit, conf_noffset,
gd_fdt_blob());
}