# Stalwart Mail Server - Helm values # # TLS for the mail listeners is sourced from cert-manager: the # mail-vhaudiquet-fr-tls Secret (see certificate.yaml) is mounted into the pod # and pushed to Stalwart by the chart's tls-sync sidecar over JMAP, which also # calls ReloadTlsCertificates on every cert-manager renewal. # Container image image: repository: stalwartlabs/stalwart tag: v0.16.11 pullPolicy: IfNotPresent # Single-node RocksDB deployment. replicaCount: 1 role: "" pushShard: "" # Recovery / bootstrap administrator. # The Secret (stalwart-recovery-admin) is required for the lifetime of the # deployment because the tls-sync sidecar authenticates to Stalwart's JMAP API # with these credentials on every cert-manager renewal. recoveryAdmin: enabled: true username: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/BGEPaI=,iv:QTV3fDckhrdxI0k43vUY/6Hr15pCcEQostuxcAHEF+g=,tag:nSGTlZJuclizN2AKtfGG0A==,type:str] password: "" existingSecret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:P/5gC7128OrelglEo5iTGTva45BOI3E=,iv:W0QngumMdOo/LFXdUrMN236CIHaOh8N9cj1wMEtfr3Q=,tag:5QLyu1Yd31YCZfRRYyK+2g==,type:str] usernameKey: username passwordKey: password # Recovery mode suspends mail services and exposes only the management listener. # Ship production values with this OFF. recoveryMode: enabled: false port: 8080 logLevel: info extraEnv: {} extraSecretEnv: {} # The bootstrap hook Job provisions a *fresh* domain/accounts/OIDC directory. bootstrap: enabled: false # cert-manager TLS integration for the mail (SMTP/IMAP/POP3 STARTTLS + implicit # TLS) listeners. The Secret below is produced by the Certificate in # certificate.yaml (letsencrypt-production, Cloudflare DNS-01). mailTls: enabled: true existingSecret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Mi40TeV+sRmZaEBMsOI0qgXWkMyNmQ==,iv:ExlgVMe+CONDWLmZY4uze+jhVvXN92zb2ptcLCor3Dw=,tag:4VQ38SxY28yR7kp1u69auw==,type:str] certKey: tls.crt privateKeyKey: tls.key mountPath: /etc/stalwart/tls/ingress hostname: mail.vhaudiquet.fr domain: vhaudiquet.fr # How often the sidecar re-checks the mounted cert for changes. reloadIntervalSeconds: 300 # config.json contents - ONLY the DataStore object. All other settings # (listeners, storage backends, domains, accounts, certs) live in the database # and are managed via JMAP/WebUI. config: '@type': RocksDb path: /var/lib/stalwart # Main Service: ClusterIP. Used by the Ingress for the management WebUI (mgmt) # and for in-cluster access. Mail L4 ports are exposed separately via mailService. service: type: ClusterIP ports: smtp: 25 smtps: 465 submission: 587 imap: 143 imaps: 993 pop3: 110 pop3s: 995 sieve: 4190 http: 80 https: 443 mgmt: 8080 # Dedicated LoadBalancer for SMTP/IMAP/POP3/Sieve (L4). HTTP/HTTPS/mgmt are NOT # exposed here - the WebUI is reached via the Ingress (Traefik) below. # The WAN router NAT for 25/465/587/993/995/4190 must be repointed to this IP. mailService: enabled: true name: stalwart-mail type: LoadBalancer loadBalancerIP: 10.2.2.5 annotations: {} # WebUI ingress. TLS is terminated by Caddy at the edge (wildcard cert), so the # path is: public -> Caddy (TLS) -> Traefik (HTTP) -> this Ingress -> mgmt:8080. # No TLS block here. ingress: enabled: true annotations: {} hosts: - host: mail.vhaudiquet.fr paths: - path: / pathType: Prefix portName: mgmt tls: [] # Persistent volume for the RocksDB data directory. persistence: enabled: true accessMode: ReadWriteOnce storageClass: longhorn size: 50Gi resources: requests: cpu: 250m memory: 256Mi limits: cpu: "1" memory: 1Gi # Override chart defaults to add fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch. # Without this, kubelet recursively chowns every file in the NFS-backed PVC # on every pod start (15k+ RocksDB files), causing multi-minute delays. # OnRootMismatch skips the recursive chown if the volume root already # has the correct owner (UID 2000). podSecurityContext: fsGroup: 2000 fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch runAsUser: 2000 runAsGroup: 2000 runAsNonRoot: true seccompProfile: type: RuntimeDefault containerSecurityContext: {} sops: lastmodified: "2026-08-26T19:28:03Z" mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Fh5vxhnPiSRaC/xMV06GwoNAqfiZYJHFj3xKrWzMwau2aC62JTDkEpmm/UN7w4ILQk05xjUkcoSJF5IcKT6+gjkLRVt8qwiarJDZ3SbwM11x7rm4m0wBTJIMeytq1h68l5mQ9i5yW5bxnBNDpUqaAAmq/Ev0/+6lspXw/kfJTUw=,iv:Tg5ZYPd2bpTN/gu99oJEcl0aKiNtX5xca0MUfzCXILo=,tag:2IKyAEuTjp8QhhUaNb1+5A==,type:str] pgp: - created_at: "2026-08-26T19:28:03Z" enc: |- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- hQIMA7uy4qQr71wiAQ/9FX7SR8uKEyIvQYbNb8JdhsMCjbioQc/JMvx9EWjqhIwE WTsntkuZ0874eXO4c/WicYNHtxNmeqHfyt6ByVq7F8qIsHb19u33qkc67tjGG7rh svebMITMYgfqdHOmblLMCAHVoB0tI21nyPbf4POUHUtsP0IogUogY70x2a1wefdS RpH28+VIcKQjK2l7JKIkQ81+CHy4RV50/CzVUOojSOeNPDGtsT+5I3sf7dHuj2jF Ab5MhqXICRDlTj5AXLNfGuymILVjKWytRe5dR02EpuvlLUkHH1hztZQN9TaV92sj kcEz6Qfft/PudcG4iZj6yqbjAoZjoSGEOwH/gRONa5dAamG/QGXFpaf7z6pPKHal TQPidrFADuI7upnb+1xK0rF87FQON+p4py57/H5E+0FueSqXs0MiHgc4mL06IdqR uoOODfpp4G66uxAqBxs6YvEPYxT9yib/keUQli7gFPwRjsZixm2hiwCnDPNR11gZ HjgH3XN9Ba+uELuNIRtU96uWc6HZACrq0PmCvLKgvamDd0LbK7yD1cX7OiD4XCP4 G7dllNeAgEUY2ha3xE93cMBDirSlN0LbV+NYFm2MR2IluI1DkaVDqLa3ajoP/7Qp 2zop6Mp3QEKWjZrS27eEjHHIcjGqbfvaOI1qXCHGw3elM0XkbKtaMmqV4rwjwjLS XgG9T3aqe9VCK1wyHAdsHsSgjVz+44YgoOXT2HnC4nSNej5xRZBEIfF8YNnCBiY8 sLfjNlnSVe6+x1H8VZn4NrXGOz/kwiWpMEMEQuCIbqPJt45GM+GtC1f/gj8eMyo= =IbSO -----END PGP MESSAGE----- fp: DC6910268E657FF70BA7EC289974494E76938DDC encrypted_regex: ^(password|value|ssh-key|api-key|user|username|privateKey|clientSecret|clientId|apiKey|extraArgs.*|.*Secret.*|extraEnvVars|.*SECRET.*|.*secret.*|key|.*Password|.*PASS|.*SOCIALACCOUNT_PROVIDERS|.*\.ya?ml)$ mac_only_encrypted: true version: 3.10.2