Generated into the scratch rootfs before boot: mounts each virtiofs
share (ro through the mount option), runs the payload as a child so the
init survives to write its exit code to the control file, then powers
off through sysrq, which works without a poweroff binary in the rootfs.
Shell quoting keeps payload argv and share paths free of interpolation.
Eleven calls from the stable-1.19.x headers plus krun_free_ctx, loaded
at runtime so a missing install names the remediation instead of failing
to link. Symbol lookup goes through a macro that carries the signature
from libkrun.h, every unsafe block states its invariant, and negative
returns map onto errno errors. The KVM probe ports ecr's open-then-
KVM_GET_API_VERSION check and reports KvmUnavailable with the full
remediation text.
ecrou's workspace starts from ecr's confinement-neutral half: image
reference resolution, the content cache with digest freshness, layer
extraction with whiteouts and deferred directory modes, provisioned
hot cells, and the progress/error/config plumbing. Adaptations: the
cache lives in ~/.cache/ecrou, the namespace-era error variants and
utils constants are gone, KvmUnavailable arrives ahead of its caller,
rootfs loses its exec() delegation, and uname(2) goes through libc
now that nix is no longer a dependency. The CLI crate is a stub until
its commit.
QEMU was the committed v1 engine with libkrun later; that order is
flipped. libkrun deletes the initramfs pack, the kernel fetch, slirp
config, and the uid mapping problem, and its VMM runs in-process, which
collapses the kill chain. Verified against the stable-1.19.x headers:
eleven-call v1 surface, krun_set_workdir native, mapped volumes dead on
Linux (tagged virtiofs plus guest init mount instead), KVM required
with QEMU as the later TCG fallback. Snap spike now stages libkrun
plus libkrunfw instead of qemu-system.
ecrou descends from ecr: the microVM runtime that survives strict snap
confinement. The founding rule (no host mounts, no namespaces, every
crossing a file or a socket) is stated with its syscall budget, sourced
from snapd's seccomp allowlist; execution model, exit-code propagation
through a private control share, kill-chain cancellation, the spike-snap
gate, and seven falsification tests round out the v1 design.
Valentin Haudiquet