docs: make libkrun the v1 engine

QEMU was the committed v1 engine with libkrun later; that order is
flipped. libkrun deletes the initramfs pack, the kernel fetch, slirp
config, and the uid mapping problem, and its VMM runs in-process, which
collapses the kill chain. Verified against the stable-1.19.x headers:
eleven-call v1 surface, krun_set_workdir native, mapped volumes dead on
Linux (tagged virtiofs plus guest init mount instead), KVM required
with QEMU as the later TCG fallback. Snap spike now stages libkrun
plus libkrunfw instead of qemu-system.
This commit is contained in:
Valentin Haudiquet committed 2026-10-27 21:41:30 +01:00
1 parent 5f9b2a251b
commit acf040e5b5
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@@ -7,16 +7,16 @@ from ecr, the ephemeral chroot: the name keeps the ancestor, and the
answer to "chroot ou VM" is now VM. As a bonus, an écrou is a nut: the
small part that keeps a bolt from walking out of the wall.
One sentence: resolve an image reference, boot it as a one-shot microVM,
run one command with live stdio, propagate its exit code, keep whatever
crossed the workspace share, throw the machine away.
One sentence: resolve an image reference, boot it as a one-shot microVM
on libkrun, run one command with live stdio, propagate its exit code,
keep whatever crossed the workspace share, throw the machine away.
The project is library-first like ecr: `crates/ecrou` is the library
(package `ecrou`), `crates/ecr-cli` becomes `crates/ecrou-cli` (binary
`ecrou`), a thin front-end that parses flags, maps them onto the library
API, and propagates exit codes. The library never writes to the
terminal: diagnostics go through the `log` facade, long operations
report through the `Progress` sink, all output is the CLI's.
(package `ecrou`), `crates/ecrou-cli` is the thin front-end (binary
`ecrou`) that parses flags, maps them onto the library API, and
propagates exit codes. The library never writes to the terminal:
diagnostics go through the `log` facade, long operations report through
the `Progress` sink, all output is the CLI's.
The first consumer is rhema's sandbox seam, which shells out to the
binary the way it shells out to `docker` and `lxc` today. The library
@@ -28,13 +28,48 @@ runtime.
| module | disposition |
|---|---|
| `distro`, `download`, `extract`, `rootfs`, `utils`, `progress` | ported; the image machinery is confinement-neutral plain fs and network |
| `qemu_vm` (cpio builder, KVM probe, launch) | ported and grown; becomes `initramfs` + `qemu` + `vm` |
| `kernel` | ported; Alpine `linux-virt` fetch, cache entry renamed |
| `kernel` | dropped; the kernel is libkrun's, bundled in libkrunfw |
| `qemu_vm` | dropped from v1; its KVM probe logic (open `/dev/kvm`, `KVM_GET_API_VERSION` == 12) moves into the `krun` module |
| `namespace`, `chroot`, `mount`, `exec` | dropped; they stay in ecr, their ancestor. Their error variants (`UserNamespacesUnavailable`, `BinfmtNotRegistered`, `MissingSubidRange`) leave with them |
No initramfs and no cpio builder: the rootfs crosses as a virtiofs
share, never as a packed archive.
No cache compatibility with ecr: the formats may match but the directory
is `~/.cache/ecrou` and never shared.
## The engine: libkrun
v1 has exactly one engine, libkrun, driven through its stable C ABI
(the `stable-1.19.x` headers; the main branch is mid-rewrite to a
vtable API and is not the target). ecrou `dlopen`s `libkrun.so.1` at
runtime and fails with a remediation message naming the install when it
is missing; nothing links at build time, and a snap bundles the library
plus libkrunfw next to itself.
The VMM runs inside the ecrou process: `krun_start_enter` enters the
VM loop on the calling thread. There is no child process to shepherd,
which makes the kill contract below trivial.
The FFI lives in `crates/ecrou/src/krun.rs`. ecrou carries unsafe libc
code; rhema, its first consumer, keeps `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` and
drives the CLI.
The v1 API surface is eleven calls: `krun_set_log_level`,
`krun_create_ctx`, `krun_set_vm_config`, `krun_set_root`,
`krun_add_virtiofs`, `krun_set_workdir`, `krun_set_exec`,
`krun_set_env`, `krun_set_console_output`, `krun_start_enter`,
`krun_check_nested_virt`. `krun_set_mapped_volumes` exists but is
explicitly unsupported on Linux (its header says to use user namespaces
and bind-mounts instead, which is precisely what ecrou cannot do); the
workspace is a tagged `krun_add_virtiofs` share mounted by the guest
init instead.
KVM is required. There is no TCG fallback; a machine without working
KVM is an `Error::KvmUnavailable` with the remediation text, and
`ecrou probe` reports it before any run. QEMU as a fallback engine is a
Later row, and its arrival would not change the API.
## The founding rule
ecrou's host process never mounts a filesystem and never creates or
@@ -55,101 +90,96 @@ beyond what the shares expose.
Everything the host process may do, and nothing else:
- fs: read, write, stat, rename, unlink, mkdir under the cache directory
and the share roots it was given, plus its own private tmpdir
- exec: the kernel it boots and `qemu-system-*` (later: libkrun), found
in PATH or staged in the snap
- `/dev/kvm`: open, ioctl, mmap. Optional; TCG is the fallback when the
probe finds no working KVM (`KVM_GET_API_VERSION` != 12)
- net: TCP and UDP client sockets for registry fetches, slirp's host
side, and localhost listeners only through explicit `hostfwd`
- process: fork, exec, waitpid, and signals for its own children
- fs: read, write, stat, rename, unlink, mkdir, fallocate under the
cache directory and the share roots it was given, plus the scratch
rootfs TempDir
- exec: itself; libraries via `dlopen` (`libkrun.so.1`, libkrunfw)
- `/dev/kvm`: open, ioctl, mmap
- net: TCP and UDP client sockets; with TSI these carry the guest's
connections too, proxied host-side
- process: threads, futexes, eventfds, timers; no children in v1
Denied by design: `mount`, `umount2`, `unshare`, `setns`, `pivot_root`,
`open_tree`, `move_mount`, `mount_setattr`, `fsopen`, `fsmount`,
`ptrace`, kernel module loading, keyring calls. All absent from snapd's
seccomp allowlist, which is where the allowed list above is drawn from.
Host `mknod` is allowlisted but AppArmor mediates what it can create;
ecrou has no use for it either way.
Two absences need a spike-time check because VMMs plausibly touch them:
`sched_setaffinity` and `openat2`. The spike straces for EPERM on
allowed-looking calls, and anything libkrun genuinely needs that the
allowlist denies goes on a snapd issue, never into a workaround.
## Execution model
One-shot machines. `ecrou run IMAGE -- CMD` boots one VM whose init
execs CMD as the only workload; when CMD exits, the machine powers off.
There is no exec into a running machine. No engine in the family has
that API: libkrun's `krun_set_exec` is per-context before start, and
crun's krun handler boots a fresh VM for every `crun exec`. A guest
agent and long-lived machines are a later row; per-command boots are the
v1 shape, and the boot budget below is what keeps them honest.
One-shot machines. `ecrou run IMAGE -- CMD` prepares a rootfs, boots
one VM whose payload is CMD, streams its stdio, and exits with CMD's
code when the machine powers off. There is no exec into a running
machine. No engine in the family has that API: `krun_set_exec` is
per-context before start, and crun's krun handler boots a fresh VM for
every `crun exec`. A guest agent and long-lived machines are a Later
row; per-command boots are the v1 shape, and the boot budget below is
what keeps them honest.
Ephemeral rootfs, durable workspace. The base system is an initramfs:
it exists only in RAM and dies with the machine. Persistence crosses a
workspace share or it does not happen.
Ephemeral rootfs, durable workspace. The base system is a scratch copy
of the image (a `PreparedRootfs`, TempDir-backed): it exists only for
the run and dies with it. Persistence crosses a workspace share or it
does not happen.
**Workspace shares.** `--share HOST:GUEST[:ro]`, served by 9p
(`qemu -virtfs local`). The host side is plain fs under one more
directory the budget covers; the guest init mounts it. There is no
implicit share: an empty sandbox is the default, and the consumer
chooses what crosses. This is deliberate; a sandbox runtime does not
silently attach the caller's cwd.
**Workspace shares.** `--share HOST:GUEST[:ro]`, one virtiofs share per
entry (`krun_add_virtiofs`, `krun_set_root` keeps the rootfs itself).
The host side is plain fs; the guest init mounts each share at its
guest path. There is no implicit share: an empty sandbox is the
default, and the consumer chooses what crosses. This is deliberate; a
sandbox runtime does not silently attach the caller's cwd.
**Exit codes.** The machine has a private control share: a host tmpdir
the API does not surface, mounted read-write at a fixed guest path. The
init writes CMD's exit code to a file there, then powers off; ecrou
reads it back and exits with it. Signal deaths map to 128+signal, the
shell convention the init already produces. Alternatives considered and
rejected for v1: isa-debug-exit (x86-only, awkward from a shell init)
and semihosting exit (arch-dependent). If the exit file is absent and
QEMU itself failed, that is an engine failure, reported as one, never as
a guest code.
Ownership needs no mapping layer. The guest runs as root inside its own
kernel, and libkrun's simplified virtiofs semantics report the
requesting guest uid for ownership while storing permission bits
host-side; writes through a share land owned by the host user. The
rootless subuid problem the podman shape has does not exist here.
**Cancellation is a kill.** ecrou-cli spawns QEMU with
`PR_SET_PDEATHSIG` and a kill-on-drop guard, so a killed consumer kills
the machine. No orphan QEMU survives the CLI. This is stronger than
`docker exec`'s cancel, which kills only the local client; the tests
keep it true (T4).
**The guest init.** When shares exist, the payload is a small script
provisioned into the scratch rootfs before boot: it mounts each share,
`cd`s nowhere (the workdir rides `krun_set_workdir` natively), execs
the real payload, and writes its exit code to the control file. With no
shares, the payload execs directly.
**Console.** `-serial stdio`, no monitor mux. The QEMU monitor is a
host-level control hatch over the machine; a sandbox runtime does not
mux it into the workload's stdio by accident. `--monitor` restores
`mon:stdio` for development.
**Exit codes.** The scratch rootfs doubles as the control channel: the
guest writes its exit code to a file there, and ecrou reads it back
host-side after the machine powers off. Signal deaths map to
128+signal, the shell convention the init already produces. If the
file is absent and the VMM reports a failure, that is an engine error,
reported as one, never as a guest code. Native propagation through
`krun_start_enter`'s return value is on the verify list; the file is
the contract either way, and the mechanism can only get simpler.
**Networking.** slirp user-mode only. The init configures the guest
statically (10.0.2.15/24, gateway 10.0.2.2, DNS 10.0.2.3); no DHCP
client is assumed. No tap, no bridges, ever: they need host setup the
budget cannot afford. `hostfwd` stays available for a later
sandboxd-in-guest.
**Cancellation is a kill.** The VMM lives in the ecrou process, so a
killed consumer kills the machine with it. No orphan survives. This is
stronger than `docker exec`'s cancel, which kills only the local
client; the tests keep it true (T4).
**Env and argv** ride the kernel command line base64-encoded, ecr's
trick, extended to the environment. Sane size is a few KB; oversized
payloads are a caller bug and fail loudly.
**Console.** virtio-console wired to the process's stdio, live lines
out, stdin through. `krun_set_console_output` is the fallback if the
default wiring needs redirecting. There is no QEMU monitor to mux;
`--verbose` maps to `krun_set_log_level`.
**Memory.** Default 1G, `-m` to override. ecr's CLI defaulted 2G; a
per-command machine is provisioned per command, and agent consumers run
several concurrently.
**Networking.** TSI, libkrun's default: the guest has no interface, and
its socket calls are proxied on the host's stack by the VMM process.
DNS is proxied with them (verified in T7, including the resolver file
the guest needs). Port publishing (`krun_set_port_map`) is how a later
sandboxd-in-guest serves the host. No tap, no bridges, ever: they need
host setup the budget cannot afford.
## The guest side
The init is ours, a generated shell script packed into the initramfs and
selected with `rdinit=`. It grows from ecr's (hostname, shell detection,
argv decode, sysrq poweroff fallback) with static net config, share
mounts, the workdir `cd`, and the exit-code handshake added. It uses
only what the image ships; `busybox` is not assumed.
Kernel: Alpine `linux-virt` per target arch (the `linux-lts` fallback
when no virt flavor exists), fetched and cached as today. The pack step
adds the booted kernel's `/lib/modules` tree into the initramfs: 9p and
virtio_net are modules in `linux-virt`, and the distro image's module
tree does not match the kernel we boot. The size cost is measured in
T5, and gzip compression of the initramfs is the knob if it hurts.
**Memory and CPUs.** `krun_set_vm_config`; default 1G and
all-logical-cpus, `-m` to override. A per-command machine is
provisioned per command, and agent consumers run several concurrently.
## Workspace layout
Cargo workspace, two crates, the ecr split:
- `crates/ecrou` - the library. Modules: `config`, `distro`,
`download`, `error`, `extract`, `initramfs`, `kernel`, `progress`,
`qemu`, `rootfs`, `utils`, `vm`.
`download`, `error`, `extract`, `guest` (the init script), `krun`
(the FFI), `progress`, `rootfs`, `utils`, `vm`.
- `crates/ecrou-cli` - the CLI (binary `ecrou`).
The library must not depend on CLI types; `clap` is a CLI-only
@@ -161,11 +191,13 @@ for narration, `Progress` for long operations.
### Rootfs lifecycle (ported)
`RootfsCache::new(dir)` / `default_dir()`, `prepare`, `prepare_provisioned`,
`persist`, `PrepareRequest`, `PreparedRootfs`: ecr's semantics verbatim,
including digest freshness on `:latest` and the `.provisioned` hot-cell
marker. See ecr's SPEC for the reference description; differences are
the cache directory and the kernel entry names only.
`RootfsCache::new(dir)` / `default_dir()`, `prepare`,
`prepare_provisioned`, `persist`, `PrepareRequest`, `PreparedRootfs`:
ecr's semantics verbatim, including digest freshness on `:latest` and
the `.provisioned` hot-cell marker. The per-run scratch copy is
`PreparedRootfs` as ecr already builds it. See ecr's SPEC for the
reference description; differences are the cache directory and the
absent kernel entries only.
### `vm::run`
@@ -178,21 +210,20 @@ pub struct RunOptions {
pub workspace: Option<Share>, // the one rw share consumers name
pub shares: Vec<Share>, // additional named shares, ro allowed
pub command: Vec<String>, // empty = the image's default shell
pub workdir: String, // guest cwd; empty = first share's guest path, else /
pub workdir: String, // guest cwd; empty = /
pub env: Vec<(String, String)>, // composed envp; host env never inherited
pub hostname: String, // empty = generated ecrou-vm-XXXXXX
pub quiet: bool,
pub require_kvm: bool,
}
pub fn run(options: &RunOptions, progress: &dyn Progress) -> Result<i32>
```
stdio is inherited; the return value is the guest exit code. A
`require_kvm` run with no working KVM is `Error::KvmUnavailable` with
the remediation text. Everything else is `Error::Other` over the anyhow
chain, ecr's shape. The v1 API has no captured-output variant and no
long-lived machine; consumers pump the child's stdio themselves when
they drive the CLI.
stdio is inherited; the return value is the guest exit code. A run
without working KVM is `Error::KvmUnavailable` with the remediation
text. Everything else is `Error::Other` over the anyhow chain, ecr's
shape. The v1 API has no captured-output variant and no long-lived
machine; consumers pump the child's stdio themselves when they drive
the CLI.
## CLI
@@ -206,17 +237,16 @@ ecrou probe
| `-a, --arch <arch>` | host arch | Target architecture |
| `--share <HOST:GUEST[:ro]>` | none | Workspace share; repeatable |
| `-m, --memory <size>` | 1G | Guest memory |
| `--workdir <guest path>` | first share, else `/` | Guest cwd |
| `--workdir <guest path>` | `/` | Guest cwd |
| `-e, --env <KEY=VALUE>` | none | Guest env; repeatable |
| `--require-kvm` | false | Fail instead of falling back to TCG |
| `--monitor` | false | Dev: mux the QEMU monitor onto stdio |
| `--quiet` | false | Suppress kernel log on the console |
| `--no-cache` | false | Fresh download, ignore the cache |
| `-v, --verbose` | false | Diagnostics |
| `-v, --verbose` | false | Diagnostics; raises the libkrun log level |
`ecrou probe` reports what a run would find: KVM working or the TCG
fallback, the QEMU binary, the kernel in cache, the cache directory
writable. It is the confinement diagnostic and the support tool.
`ecrou probe` reports what a run would find: KVM working (open, ioctl
version, nested-virt state), `libkrun.so.1` loadable, the cache
directory writable. It is the confinement diagnostic and the support
tool.
## File layout
@@ -225,8 +255,7 @@ writable. It is the confinement diagnostic and the support tool.
├── ubuntu-noble-amd64.tar.gz
├── alpine-edge-x86_64.tar.gz
├── <...>.digest # manifest digest sidecar
├── <...>.provisioned # hot-cell marker
└── ecrou-default-kernel-x86_64.vmlinuz
└── <...>.provisioned # hot-cell marker
```
`~/.config/ecrou.yaml` carries over (DNS overrides today).
@@ -237,57 +266,71 @@ Confinement: strict. Plugs: `network`, `home`, `kvm`. Manual
`snap connect` for kvm is accepted for now; auto-connect is a store
request and a later product decision.
The first milestone is the spike snap, ecr's VM mode behind strict
confinement, before any porting: stage `qemu-system-x86_64` and the
kernel in the snap, or fetch both through the cache in $HOME. Both fit
the budget; T1 is the gate that proves the shape under real AppArmor
and seccomp, and everything else in this document is design until it
passes.
The snap stages `libkrun.so.1` and libkrunfw next to the binary; at
roughly 6 MB combined they cost less than any qemu-system package, and
the kernel ships inside libkrunfw, so there is nothing else to fetch or
stage.
The first milestone is the spike snap, before any porting: a minimal
libkrun binary behind strict confinement running a VM. T1 is the gate
that proves the shape under real AppArmor and seccomp, and everything
else in this document is design until it passes.
## Falsification tests
- **T1, confinement.** The spike snap runs `ecrou run alpine -- uname
-a` under strict confinement. The guest kernel version differing from
the host is the microVM proof, the same check crun's krun man page
prescribes.
prescribes. The same run straces for EPERM on plausible VMM calls
(`sched_setaffinity`, `openat2`) and reports findings to the snapd
issue list.
- **T2, workspace coherence.** In a shared workspace, the guest runs
git init, add, commit, status; the host sees the commits; a second
machine sees the first's writes. Git's mmap'd index is the trap this
test exists for.
test exists for, and libkrun's virtiofs DAX windows are exactly where
it bites.
- **T3, exit codes.** `ecrou run alpine -- sh -c "exit 7"` exits 7.
A guest signal death exits 128+signal. A killed QEMU reports an
A guest signal death exits 128+signal. A failed VMM reports an
engine failure, never a guest code.
- **T4, kill chain.** SIGKILL ecrou-cli mid-run; QEMU is gone within a
second, no orphan, verified by scanning the process table.
- **T5, boot economics.** KVM boot-to-init for alpine with
`linux-virt` lands under 1.5 s including the module-tree pack cost.
TCG numbers are recorded, not gated.
- **T4, kill chain.** SIGKILL ecrou-cli mid-run; the VM is gone with
the process, no stray threads or KVM VMs, verified by scanning the
process table and `/dev/kvm` users.
- **T5, boot economics.** Alpine, cache-warm: extract plus boot lands
under 1.5 s to first guest output. Larger images report their numbers
unblocked; the shared-ro-rootfs row in Later is the fix if they hurt.
- **T6, no-mount audit.** `strace -f -e trace=mount,umount2,unshare,
setns,pivot_root,open_tree,move_mount,fsopen,fsmount` over a full run
with shares: zero hits. This test is the founding rule.
- **T7, guest network.** An https fetch from the guest succeeds.
- **T7, guest network.** An https fetch from the guest succeeds, DNS
included; a published port is reachable from the host.
## Later
- **libkrun engine.** The FFI lives here; ecrou already carries unsafe
libc, and rhema keeps its `forbid(unsafe_code)`. Sub-second boots,
the kernel bundled in libkrunfw, TSI networking instead of slirp.
Same budget, one more engine.
- **Tiny initramfs.** A fixed small init with the rootfs itself served
over 9p, killing the per-run pack cost and the RAM floor.
- **QEMU engine.** The TCG fallback for machines without KVM. The
`RunOptions` API does not change; the engine choice is the probe's.
- **Shared read-only rootfs.** Serve the cache rootfs directly, ro,
with a guest-side overlay for writes: no extraction per run. The
correct-and-slow v1 posture graduates into this.
- **Guest agent, long-lived machines.** Exec without a boot; the shape
to grow into when per-command VMs stop being right.
- **passt** if slirp throughput ever matters.
- **sandboxd-in-guest** over hostfwd: rhema's http backend pointed
into a machine.
- **passt** (`krun_set_passt_fd`) if TSI throughput or UDP listening
ever matters.
- **sandboxd-in-guest** over `krun_set_port_map`: rhema's http backend
pointed into a machine.
- **Rootfs persistence** through `prepare_provisioned` hot cells,
already in the ported code.
## Open questions
- 9p versus virtiofsd as the share transport. 9p needs no extra daemon;
virtiofsd is the modern path but is another staged binary. Decide
when T2 runs; the `Share` API does not change either way.
- Initramfs compression default: uncompressed boots fastest, gzip
halves the RAM floor. Measure in T5.
- Whether `probe` belongs in the library or stays CLI-only.
- Does `krun_start_enter` return the guest exit code natively on
poweroff? The control file works regardless; if the return value
carries it, the mechanism shrinks to a read.
- Console wiring: does the default virtio-console land on the VMM's
stdio, and is stdin carried? Decided by a first-run experiment, with
`krun_set_console_output` as the fallback.
- TSI DNS: which resolver file the guest needs, and whether lookups
just work. T7 decides.
- dlopen versus link-time linking for the snap; dlopen is the default
for the remediation error it enables.
- Which distros package libkrun (Fedora does; Debian and Ubuntu do not
yet) and what the dev-install story says meanwhile.