# Stalwart Mail Server - Helm values # # TLS for the mail listeners is sourced from cert-manager: the # mail-vhaudiquet-fr-tls Secret (see certificate.yaml) is mounted into the pod # and pushed to Stalwart by the chart's tls-sync sidecar over JMAP, which also # calls ReloadTlsCertificates on every cert-manager renewal. # Container image image: repository: stalwartlabs/stalwart tag: v0.16.11 pullPolicy: IfNotPresent # Single-node RocksDB deployment. replicaCount: 1 role: "" pushShard: "" # Recovery / bootstrap administrator. # The Secret (stalwart-recovery-admin) is required for the lifetime of the # deployment because the tls-sync sidecar authenticates to Stalwart's JMAP API # with these credentials on every cert-manager renewal. recoveryAdmin: enabled: true username: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:W7aZNhA=,iv:d0DosYNdnmJEc3pMIEgTSl3YyUGUvdSFUxty7oGj0s8=,tag:N4U5dbxg2gU/8bDsZKHaCQ==,type:str] password: "" existingSecret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:UrgIv36m86twJhcccQFl5+yDc7+8vYQ=,iv:RekqnmgiD7nmwc1PPdEjX4hBAom9dckvjfIPEFniESc=,tag:NwpbBZcG/FU4K8gRDLmESQ==,type:str] usernameKey: username passwordKey: password # Recovery mode suspends mail services and exposes only the management listener. # Ship production values with this OFF. recoveryMode: enabled: false port: 8080 logLevel: info extraEnv: {} extraSecretEnv: {} # The bootstrap hook Job provisions a *fresh* domain/accounts/OIDC directory. bootstrap: enabled: false # cert-manager TLS integration for the mail (SMTP/IMAP/POP3 STARTTLS + implicit # TLS) listeners. The Secret below is produced by the Certificate in # certificate.yaml (letsencrypt-production, Cloudflare DNS-01). mailTls: enabled: true existingSecret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:mYuo+xDaQyYhAE/3iiSj+2HEcZF1/w==,iv:8Pauul2cBj6Hu4QoSJS/LGMpofkaZOJJqJJLDjkQ8QE=,tag:yf3216LoI8DfqQDQplhlDQ==,type:str] certKey: tls.crt privateKeyKey: tls.key mountPath: /etc/stalwart/tls/ingress hostname: mail.vhaudiquet.fr domain: vhaudiquet.fr # How often the sidecar re-checks the mounted cert for changes. reloadIntervalSeconds: 300 # config.json contents - ONLY the DataStore object. All other settings # (listeners, storage backends, domains, accounts, certs) live in the database # and are managed via JMAP/WebUI. config: '@type': RocksDb path: /var/lib/stalwart # Main Service: ClusterIP. Used by the Ingress for the management WebUI (mgmt) # and for in-cluster access. Mail L4 ports are exposed separately via mailService. service: type: ClusterIP ports: smtp: 25 smtps: 465 submission: 587 imap: 143 imaps: 993 pop3: 110 pop3s: 995 sieve: 4190 http: 80 https: 443 mgmt: 8080 # Dedicated LoadBalancer for SMTP/IMAP/POP3/Sieve (L4). HTTP/HTTPS/mgmt are NOT # exposed here - the WebUI is reached via the Ingress (Traefik) below. # The WAN router NAT for 25/465/587/993/995/4190 must be repointed to this IP. mailService: enabled: true name: stalwart-mail type: LoadBalancer loadBalancerIP: 10.2.2.5 annotations: {} # WebUI ingress. TLS is terminated by Caddy at the edge (wildcard cert), so the # path is: public -> Caddy (TLS) -> Traefik (HTTP) -> this Ingress -> mgmt:8080. # No TLS block here. ingress: enabled: true annotations: {} hosts: - host: mail.vhaudiquet.fr paths: - path: / pathType: Prefix portName: mgmt tls: [] # Persistent volume for the RocksDB data directory. persistence: enabled: true accessMode: ReadWriteOnce storageClass: longhorn size: 50Gi resources: requests: cpu: 250m memory: 256Mi limits: cpu: "1" memory: 1Gi # Override chart defaults to add fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch. # Without this, kubelet recursively chowns every file in the NFS-backed PVC # on every pod start (15k+ RocksDB files), causing multi-minute delays. # OnRootMismatch skips the recursive chown if the volume root already # has the correct owner (UID 2000). podSecurityContext: fsGroup: 2000 fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch runAsUser: 2000 runAsGroup: 2000 runAsNonRoot: true seccompProfile: type: RuntimeDefault containerSecurityContext: {} sops: lastmodified: "2026-08-20T21:26:03Z" mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/Csupnf8vdHopaEP3+MOjv+99hs1muhP5mIZCNObOoEI3oxgJMNWHhi98YzSf4d/hpubTIkirryXrtK+bvdBJYydcdxd2BKPeFnVQwGdWG8VTZoW/8xWSufKOxGsJtjKtaLh5Q1b1WYsTKsfB0WF1QlEig4CWXtDTuCTncQktvo=,iv:v79M2+gzuMPE0epOCKuFs7VXnzdkeautJFp7K6PP7f0=,tag:ew9yozsxReJgyrapnQxmrg==,type:str] pgp: - created_at: "2026-08-20T21:26:03Z" enc: |- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- hQIMA7uy4qQr71wiARAAvURAKFHR8V4cEhWqXh2hhTklHH4ob4lUC5nbIQQepSlm MgVKyOVtOb1fcyK6nIFpAFEkiUQrg3pffxv/jCKpkL+C+UecUemuL51CgD/zGGkk LAWqpSyicSG81yx1DVNvbTOGozwbl3YvLKl2mQz4gvfHe/Lf69EHdPPPVdoJS9in DlZ/jwSkyXX6D4l9op4fKCW3uqTXlRWUSY2aK+sYsbINeQD9u6pdfF0Tig+Gxx2u 0B+UxknMthkPEgWAjX3KQTahlu8Nbp419BRg9TTIu8frkNvo9tGXJ0cd912yBrrV iSGq3GZ8ZLpHJoGRK/yfL1gsNRTLAFed1HPQ0P/5N19zJojf8bnm6HpMbb+2zT4X 4KugSImWtczsXPKvtysUgboXJYJCXwCVaIwQQ6Husz2W2fjwLT4aj6GoRn6hi8pL TTDi57iMfKmbHOZsxFM47odM95u/fPfZZjZmk/51OkJD1hndrm1QrNdLR2/ZXSTk kgblBHzPUMkkQHkGhk4HjQ82OCfKEi7S2syWtEqHQD0FKrJsZHpF8JJcO4ntyYCr SWzFK6LHi1l4LkswrCFv+/HfQGGU3g9zYUT9c8ys0taNkHXUS0sDgLgC9esWxTuk I0K7TEE6HhfD8CTnBiiqz2OqPyCs2ukUqK0DLrJvuQZnbL3s5Z8p4ISUYJdmecvS XAGtE+9OR+2fHlR9DEa1oryNl/IHpm+ERSHs5PTSjsh2yyPpILln20DZxx8ry23A ILyBwxcGVH9cSd2vH1doK8IyvNwh4bMFFbj3OOUsWBZaqqDQjJxOprumHA7P =1Bee -----END PGP MESSAGE----- fp: DC6910268E657FF70BA7EC289974494E76938DDC encrypted_regex: ^(password|value|ssh-key|api-key|user|username|privateKey|clientSecret|clientId|apiKey|extraArgs.*|.*Secret.*|extraEnvVars|.*SECRET.*|.*secret.*|key|.*Password|.*PASS|.*SOCIALACCOUNT_PROVIDERS|.*\.ya?ml)$ version: 3.10.2